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A b s tra c t
Impairments o f social behavior after cerebral damage are common. Studies suggest that in 
some brain-injured individuals the fundamental mechanisms underlying emotion recognition 
(Braun, Denault, Cohen & Rouleau, 1994; Jackson & Moffat, 1987) and empathy (Eslinger, 
1998; Grattan, Bloomer, Archambault & Eslinger, 1994) are disturbed. To our knowledge, 
there has been no published research on the interaction between emotion recognition and 
empathy in brain-injured groups. The present study investigated how impairment in the 
ability to recognize visual and verbal emotion covaries with the ability to empathize 
(cognitively and emotionally). Specifically, it was hypothesized that poor ability to recognize 
emotion would positively correlate with socially inadequate forms of empathy. A group o f 
individuals with brain injury and a normal control group were administered the Victoria 
Emotion Recognition Test (VERT), Hogan’s Empathy Scale (EM) and the Questionnaire 
Measure o f Emotional Empathy (QMEE). Results indicate that overall, individuals with 
brain injury had lower scores on all subscales of the VERT as well as on the EM. No 
differences were found between groups on the QMEE. The scores for both groups were 
found to correlate positively between the EM and VERT as well as between the EM and 
QMEE.
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Emotion Recognition and Empathy After Brain Injury
Inadequate social behavior is often the most devastating effect of brain injury. 
Frequently, there is good recovery o f  physical and cognitive abilities and the functional effect 
o f any deficits evident can be addressed with compensatory strategies or devices. The 
primary impediment for most people with brain injury is the typical poor recovery o f 
judgement, self control and social sensitivity (Lezak, 1983). Central to social adjustment and 
social sensitivity is the recognition of emotion: an essential prerequisite for empathy (Strayer, 
1987). It follows then, that if  emotional recognition is compromised, empathie ability may 
also be affected. A number o f  studies have revealed significant deficits in emotion 
recognition in people with brain injuiy (Adolphs, Damasio, Daniel, & Damasio, 1996; 
Borod, Cicero, Obler, Welkowitz & Erhan, 1999; Gainotti, 1999). Impairment o f social 
behavior has also been associated with several forms o f acquired brain damage, including 
stroke, traumatic brain injury, tumor, and aneurysm rupture with surgical repair (Grattan, 
Bloomer, Archambault & Eslinger, 1994). Brain-injured patients may exhibit personality 
disturbances such as irritability, anger, impulsiveness, rapid mood changes, inappropriate 
social responses, suspiciousness o f others, self-centered behavior, insensitivity to others, and 
loss o f  drive or initiative (Prigatano, 1992). Patients with fi-ontai lobe lesions have been 
described as insensitive, egocentric and lacking in the expression o f mutual understanding 
or concern, often presenting with inappropriate comments (Eslinger, 1998). These social 
impairments may be a direct result of lack o f empathy (Grattan & Eslinger, 1989).
Grant and Alves’ (1987) have noted that “the bulk o f the morbidity from brain injury
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in survivors stems from neuropsychiatrie and behavioral derangements” (p. 259). Such 
changes in personality and interpersonal relationships may be difficult to comprehend or 
tolerate (Braun, Baribeau, Ethier, Daigneault & Proubc, 1989; Lezak, 1988) presenting a 
serious barrier to management, rehabilitation and vocational adjustment. These changes are 
among the most difficult aspects of neurobehavioral impairments to assess and target for 
rehabilitation (Grattan and Eslinger, 1989; Klonoff, Costa & Snow, 1986; Prigatano, 1987). 
Moreover, deciphering whether personality changes are a result o f the head trauma itself or 
i f  they are the product o f frustration and fears arising from changes in functioning as a result 
o f the injury proves to be an additional challenge (Mountain, 1993).
The study by Braun et al. (1989) provides a good example of the effects o f brain 
injuiy on emotion recognition. This study compared 31 normals and 31 severely closed-head 
injvired patients on the facial test o f emotion (FTE) and a contextual task o f emotion (GTE). 
The FTE consisted o f 36 slides representing facial expressions o f the six transcultural 
expressions as proposed by Ekman and colleagues, namely, joy, fear, sadness, anger, 
surprise and disgust. The subjects were required to name the appropriate emotion for each 
slide. The GTE consisted o f correctly identifying the appropriate emotion for each of the 36 
brief verbal narratives representing situations of a same sex individual expressing emotions. 
The closed-head injury (GFH) patients were impaired overall on the FTE but not the GTE. 
However, the ability to identify anger was significantly impaired on both tasks. It was 
concluded that a processing deficit o f primary emotional material, specifically anger, does 
exist following GHI.
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Grattan and Eslinger (1992) present the case study o f  DT to illustrate the effects of 
brain injury on empathy, as well as other psychological aspects. At the age o f 33, 26 years 
after a trauma causing focal frontal lobe damage, patient DT was evaluated on standardized 
measures o f  empathy, psychosocial development, and aspects o f personality. Results 
indicate that DT had a very limited capacity for empathie understanding, an inadequate 
identity development, difficulties in vocational adjustment, and a concrete level o f moral 
reasoning. Additionally, it appeared that her social development remained at an early 
adolescent level. It was concluded that early frontal lobe damage has profoimd effects on 
social maturation and development.
The consequences o f cerebral damage on empathie measures have only recently 
begun to be studied (Grattan, Bloomer, Archambault & Eslinger, 1994). As a result, there 
are no studies, to date, reported in the literature in which a head-injured sample has been 
identified as having deficits in empathy as a direct result o f the ability to recognize emotion. 
The primary purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that one aspect o f social 
impairment observed in brain-damaged individuals (i.e., reduced empathy) may covaiy with 
the ability to recognize emotion. Since two forms of empathy (cognitive and emotional) 
have been previously identified with a brain-injured population (Eslinger, 1998), both will 
be examined in relation to emotion recognition.
Background
Emotion Recognition
Emotion represents a significant behavioral attribute and has been studied and
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discussed through history. It can be considered the result o f mood (the inner, subjective 
feelings), affect (the outer objective manifestations o f feeling), drive, and cognitive control. 
Emotion is difficult to define and has been used, at best, only broadly and vaguely. Emotion 
can suggest an agitated, excited mental state (an emotional outburst) but more often some 
cognitive connotation is included. Thus, emotion has been called the “affective state of 
consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, and the like is experienced” (New Webster’s 
dictionary, 1975). Emotion, however, is a much broader term than this and brings together 
a variety o f behavioral attributes including mood, affect and drive (Benson, 1984).
Our understanding o f emotion has come a long way fi"om the early contributions o f 
Galen and the philosophers of the Dark Ages. It is no longer believed that, for example, an 
excess of a melancholic humor would produce a feeling o f sadness; nor is it accepted that 
emotional problems result from the invading spirit o f the Devil.
Current research shows that emotion can be influenced by neurologic disturbances 
that result from disorders involving diverse neuroanatomical stmctures (Benson, 1984). In 
a study by Kolb and Taylor (1981) subjects (20 normal controls and 58 patients who had 
undergone frontal cortical excision) were shown seven key photographs, each o f  which 
depicted one o f the verbally categorizable emotions described by Ekman, Friesen and 
Ellsworth (1973). The subject was then shown 24 photographs of faces and was asked to 
match each of them with the key photograph that most closely expressed the same emotion. 
The results indicated that the patients with frontal and temporal lesions in the right 
hemisphere as well as frontal lesions in the left hemisphere were especially poor at matching.
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This suggests that the right hemisphere plays a maj or role in appreciation o f facial expression 
as well as the production o f affective behavior while there is some contribution by the left 
frontal hemisphere. Patients with damage to the prefrontal temporal cortex or posterior 
parietal cortex o f either hemisphere were impaired at matching facial expressions with verbal 
descriptions.
In a similar study, Rubinow and Post (1992) found that depressed patients were 
significantly impaired in the recognition of affect in facial, but not verbal, expression. 
Among the 7 affects measured, depressed patients made significantly fewer correct matches 
for sad, happy, and interested face items. Rubinow and Post (1992) suggest that patients with 
an affective disorder have a relatively selective right hemispheric dysfunction. In addition, 
they suggest that these patients are characterized by deficits in both receptive (perceptual) 
as well as expressive (behavioral/emotional) function.
The cognitive task o f facial recognition is a useful investigative tool in the study of 
affective disorders because of the extent to which this cognitive process has been localized 
neuroanatomicaUy and because of its potential role in interpreting and determining social 
behavior (Borod, Koff, Perlman, & Nicholas,1986; Gruzelier, Seymour, Wilson, Jolly & 
Hirsch,1988; Kolb & Taylor, 1996).
Empathy
In the broadest sense, empathy refers to the reactions o f one individual to the 
observed experiences of another. Empathy has been considered by some investigators to be 
a cognitive phenomenon, with a resulting research focus on such “intellectual” processes as 
accurate perceptions of others. Dymond (1949), the first to introduce the cognitively based
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theory, defined empathy as predictive accuracy, and developed measures useful in 
differentiating levels o f cognitive social insight. A more recent and widely referenced 
(Chlopan et al. 1985; Eslinger, 1998; Grattan et al., 1994) definition o f empathy is the one 
proposed by Hogan (1969) which states that empathy is the capacity to apprehend another 
person’s situation in such a way that there is a potential for mutual sharing or understanding 
through an interpersonal relationship. This concept of empathy is central for understanding 
the nature o f social interactions and to Hogan (1969), moral development. The dynamics of 
interpersonal relations rely on the empathie dispositions o f the interacting individuals. That 
is, an individual’s ability to role-take or to express social sensitivity to another person who, 
for example, is experiencing distress, will determine the degree o f effective interaction. 
There has been a great deal o f attention given to this aspect o f social functioning (Gough, 
1965 ; Hogan, 1969; Mead, 1934). Mead’s writings (1934), for example, suggest that role- 
taking ability is the key variable in social functioning and that social sensitivity has origins 
in the central nervous system. Hogan (1969) maintains that empathy is an internal ability to 
adopt a broad moral perspective. Specifically, Hogan asserts that by taking a moral point o f 
view, a person is said to consider the consequences of their actions for the welfare o f others. 
Further, the individual has a willingness to put oneself in another person’s place and will 
modify one’s behavior as a result. Essentially, cognitive theorists argue that empathy 
involves the ability to take another’s viewpoint or to infer their feelings.
Other researchers have used a definition o f  empathy stressing its emotional facets 
and have studied topics such as helping behavior (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) in which
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emotional reactivity appears to play an important role (see Davis, 1983). Within this 
emotionally-based approach, empathy is defined as a vicarious emotional response to the 
perceived emotional experiences o f others (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972). Mehrabian 
(1972) operationalizes empathy by postulating that a person with a  high level o f  emotional 
empathy is less likely to engage in aggressive behavior, particularly when the pain cues from 
the victim are immediate, and is more likely to engage in helping behavior when noticing 
distress in another. In general, the person experiences heightened responsiveness to 
another’s emotional experience. Further, Mehrabian notes that the primary emotional 
component o f empathie tendency is heightened arousal (i.e., higher empathie tendency 
people tend to be more aroused by other’s emotional experiences, both positive and 
negative).
Agreement that empathy is a multifaceted phenomenon has steadily grown in recent 
years, with the sentiment expressed perhaps most clearly by Deutsh and Madle (1975). They 
advised that “in the event that new measures are developed, attempts should be made to . .
. not represent a single construct, but rather multiple and perhaps related constructs that more 
valid measures can be developed than in the past” (p.277). In this respect, empathy can be 
referred to as the cognitive and emotional systems that coordinate social interactions that 
permit sharing o f experiences as well as understanding o f  others. It is suggested, that by 
adopting both approaches and studying empathy as a multi-dimensional construct, more 
comprehensive results will be obtained (Eslinger, 1998; Eslinger, Satish and Grattan, 1996).
For the purposes o f this paper, empathy refers to the cognitive and emotional 
processes that bind people together in various kinds o f  relationships that permit sharing o f
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experiences as well as understanding o f others.
Importance of Emotion Recognition Ability 
Recognition o f emotion in facial expressions and verbal intonation is a perceptual- 
interpretive process that is highly developed in human and nonhuman primates, reflecting 
its social and behavioral importance. Social interchange requires that people master, to a 
degree, the ability to express and perceive affect on faces and in discourse (Braun, Baribeau, 
Ethier, Daigneault & Proulx, 1989). As previously mentioned, emotion recognition is singled 
out as one of the two cognitive prerequisites for empathy (the other being role taking) 
(Strayer, 1987). That is, affect recognition skills seem especially necessary for the fine-tuning 
o f empathy for a specific individual in a given situation. The development of discrimination 
o f emotions include perceptual skills, both within and across communication channels, as 
well as the use o f  situation information. Effectively, this means that in order to be able to 
express cognitive or emotional sharing o f another person’s joy or distress, a person must first 
be able to recognize facial expressions, verbal tones and situational cues. Specifically, 
development o f  knowledge o f both social display rules and expressive styles are essential 
(Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Human infants may recognize emotion and facial expression 
when only several months of age (Trevarthen, 1985), and it has been suggested that 
disruption o f the face-processing system contributes to the inappropriate social behavior and 
social ostracism that follows damage to the amygdala (Perrett et al 1982; Rubinow and Post, 
1992).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Brain-Injury, Emotion Recognition and Empathy 16
Importance o f Empathy 
As the patterns o f human behavior become increasingly interdependent (i.e., work­
place teams, contract work-groups), adaptive social behavior does as well. One factor 
considered to be a contributor to positive human interaction and altruistic behavior is 
empathy. Recent studies suggest that empathy, a fundamental mechanism of social behavior, 
can be disturbed by acquired cerebral damage (Eslinger, 1998).
Empathy has been argued to be a fundamental component o f moral judgement 
HofiBnan (1987; see pp 58-77 for further detail) discusses how moral principles are often 
presented as abstractions. When they are, however, formulated in actual life events where 
the people, situations and consequences are real, empathy becomes an instrumental tool in 
making decisions.
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Gender Effects
Emotion
The social psychology literature tends to support the notion that females are more 
sensitive to the recognition of emotion. Hall (1978,1984) reviewed 75 studies that pertained 
to the gender effects o f the decoding of nonverbal cues. The findings revealed that females 
were more skilled than males in emotion recognition expressly when the information was 
delivered via two modalities (auditory and visual). Additionally, a study by Fimder and 
Harris (1986) found that in undergraduates, female subjects scored significantly higher than 
the males on the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS).
Conversely, a study on 2 16 undergraduate students (131 female, 85 male) by Parker, 
Taylor and Bagby (1993) found no significant gender effect on the ability to recognize 
emotion jfiom a still photo. Additionally, in studies by Moimtain (1993) and Lowick (1995), 
gender effects in recognition of emotion were not found. There were no differences between 
males and females on their scores on the clinical version of the Victoria Emotion 
Recognition Test (VERT-C).
Altogether, the early literature supports the notion that females tend to be more aware 
o f  the emotions of those around them. There is, however, more recent evidence that gender 
differences in recognition of emotion are not as clearly defined as once presumed. 
Empathy
Most studies o f gender differences in empathy have been aimed at testing the 
stereotypic view that females are more empathetic than males. In the sociology literature.
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it is often asserted that the variations in behavior between men and women are due to the 
socially prescribed norms where men are required to provide for the family and women are 
required to nurture and care for the family. From this perspective, nurturance and empathy 
are viewed as important qualities for the women to have, and unnecessary for men to have 
in order to carry out their roles (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987).
The data from the research on gender differences and empathy appear to depend on 
how empathy is operationalized and the method in which the test is administered. The 
definitions o f empathy vary. Mehrabian and Epstein (1972), for example, view empathy as 
an emotional phenomena. Hogan (1969), on the other hand, holds empathy to be a cognitive 
phenomena. The measures that the researchers develop reflect their respective paradigm, 
thus affecting how the results will appear. That is, gender differences in empathy may be an 
artifact o f the method o f measurement.
On the measurement o f  empathy through self-report scales (i.e., Mehrabian’s 
Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy, QMEE, and Hogan’s Empathy Scale, EM), 
there are concerns about self-presentation. This may account for the observed sex 
differences on dispositional measures of distress and empathy. Although females 
consistently report more distress and empathy on self-report measures than do males, these 
sex differences tend to disappear when one takes physiological measures of the reaction to 
another’s emotional distress (Batson, Fultz & Schoenrade, 1987). This pattern of results 
suggests that the observed sex differences on self-report measures may be due, at least in 
part, to differences in sex-role norms that make it more appropriate for females to report both 
upset, anxious feelings, and tender, compassionate feelings.
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In a review o f recent research concerning gender differences in empathy, Lennon and 
Eisenberg (1987) suggest that when demand characteristics were high and participants had 
conscious control o f their responses (i.e., self-report), gender differences were large, favoring 
females. When demand characteristics were more subtle and subjects were unlikely to 
exercise control over their responding (physiological and somatic indices), no gender 
differences were found. Further, it was suggested that when measures were more likely to 
tap sympathetic responding (i.e., self-reports in some simulated situations and other reports), 
females appeared to be more emotionally reactive than males.
In sum, whether there is a true sex difference in emotional reactions to the distress 
of othersj as opposed to reports of these reactions is not as yet clear. What is known, 
however, that when interpreting results, it is essential to consider the theoretical framework 
from which the results are derived.
Age Effects
Emotion
Many studies have been devoted to determining when the ability to recognize 
emotion develops. In one study, Trevarthen (1984) established that recognition of primary 
facial emotions (happiness, sadness and surprise) may be innate. Trevarthen’s results 
indicated that neonates (average age, 36 hours) were able to recognize and imitate the 
emotions expressed by the experimenter.
Findings of age-related increases in the decoding o f nonverbal, especially facial, 
expressive emotional cues (e.g., Morency & Krauss, 1982) support the notion that some
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analytic skills are involved in recognition o f emotion. Recognition o f emotions conveyed 
by situational and verbal content is also important (Strayer, 1987). Children’s situation 
understanding o f emotions, studied by Barden, Zelco, Duncan, and Masters (1980) indicates 
commonly shared attributions regarding situation-emotion relationships across age, as well 
as age-related differences in the prevalence o f certain situational explanations for emotions. 
Studies involving mixed messages among emotion cues suggest that these would likely 
promote confusion rather than empathy in young children, who seem less able than older 
children and adults to compare differing facial, vocal, and bodily emotional cues 
simultaneously (Strayer, 1987).
Studies with children aging from 3 to 12 indicate that there is an increase in the 
ability to recognize emotions over this age range (Dimitrovsky, 1964; Stifrer & Fox, 1987) 
but after this point, the differences between children in their early teens and adults is 
negligible (Soppe, 1988). These results are consistent with the fact that development o f the 
frontal lobes occurs in the early years of adolescence.
A study comparing the recognition o f emotion through adulthood (Moreno, Borod, 
Welkowitz & Alpert, 1993) contrasted females in three age groups (ranging from 21 to 81), 
with 30 subjects per group, on a measure o f facial emotion recognition, using happiness, 
surprise, disgust, and sadness. Analysis o f the results indicate that age was not a factor in 
overall facial recognition in this study. Further, Jackson and Moffat (1987) found no 
significant correlation between age (mean age 40.8 years, SD = 14.3) and scores on measures 
o f recognition of facial expression and postural expression in the control subjects.
Alternatively, some studies have indicated that perceptual difficulties (Etcoff, 1984),
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response time, and cognitive attention problems (Tomkins & Flowers, 1985) may be more 
prominent in subj ects over 60 as such processes decline in effectiveness. As summarized by 
Mountain (1993), the neuropsychological literature has not focused on the study o f  emotion 
recognition across the life span. The available literature does, however, indicate that there 
is no report o f  increased accuracy o f recognition after the age of six. In case. Mountain
(1993) indicated in her research that a sample o f  older subjects (average age = 72) performed 
significantly poorer on the VERT-C than those in the younger group on all three subtests. 
This is in contrast to the developmental literature discussed above.
Empathy
As individuals progress through the different stages of moral and psychosocial 
development, changes in empathy can be seen (Kolberg, 1969). At a very young age, some 
children have the capacity for empathie responsiveness as they have the cognitive reasoning 
abilities (Kaplan, 1977; Piaget, 1951; Zahn-Waxier, Radke-Yarrow & King, 1977), the 
implicit awareness that one’s own psychological condition can differ firom that o f another, 
and a basic ability to assume the psychological role o f others (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). 
The development of empathy begins as early as 2 months in mother-infant play where face 
to face interaction establishes affective synchrony (Thompson & Lamb, 1983). From this 
point, the development of empathy is established through social referencing at about 10 
months, prosocial initiatives as toddlers and emotional sharing by school age (Barnett, 1987). 
By early teenage years people are capable o f  having an emotional reaction congruent to the 
perceived distress of someone else.
In one o f the first studies that examined empathie response, Berger (1962) had
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subjects observe a target person receive an electric shock to their arm. It was hypothesized 
that if  the observers were responding to other’s distress, they would exhibit a physiological 
reaction to the target person’s reception of shock. The results were consistent with the 
assumption that people can experience emotion as a result o f perceiving another in pain and 
becoming physiologically aroused. Subsequent research (Hygge, 1976; Milgram, 1963; 
Stotland, 1969) has provided additional evidence that people react emotionally as they 
effectively vicariously experience the pain of the target individual.
Studies investigating the effect of head trauma on empathy usually involve 
participants ranging in age from 12 to 81 years. There have been, however, two case studies 
that have examined the long-term psychological consequences o f brain injury: patient JP 
(Ackerly, 1964) and patient DT (Grattan & Eslinger, 1992). In both cases, it was found that 
early childhood frontal lobe lesions resulted in life long social and emotional maladjustment. 
These patients remained at the developmental stage achieved at the time of injury as social 
maturation was arrested.
In summary, accounts of basic forms of empathy apparent at a very young age 
suggests a biological underpinning. In addition, children who have sustained frontal lobe 
lesions tend to remain at that level o f empathie capability throughout their life. With age, 
the degree to which empathy is expressed is reflective o f the level o f social development.
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Neurological and Neuropsychological Correlates
Emotion Recognition
Virtually any alteration o f central nervous system (CNS) activity can change an 
individual’s personality (Kolb, 1985). For example, impainnents o f movement, perception 
or language can affect how an individual behaves and is perceived by others. Further, such 
impairments will affect how the individual perceives others.
Over the past decade, a view has emerged that there is both a lateralization o f control 
o f certain emotional processes (right hemisphere being dom inant) as well as a localization 
of control to the frontal and medial temporal regions. Although there are reports of important 
left hemisphere contributions to discrimination o f facial identity and/or expression (Damasio, 
Damasio & Van Hoeson, 1982; Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1981; Safer, 1981), most studies 
have indicated a greater contribution o f the right hemisphere (Borod, Koff, Perlman & 
Nicholas, 1986; Ellis & Shepherd, 1975; Etcoff, 1984, Braun et al, 1994). The research 
literature supports the assertion that the right-hemisphere (primarily in the frontal and 
temporal lobes) plays a dominant role in the processing o f content (Braun et al., 1994; 
George et al., 1996; Ley & Bryden, 1982) and identification o f emotion expressed visually 
and verbally (Braun etal., 1994; Denes et al., 1984). Weddell (1994) suggested that emotion 
recognition may be mediated by frontal-striatal pathways. Bowers et al. (1991) and Young 
et al. (1995) have shown that patients with right (but not left) cerebral injuries tend to 
demonstrate an overall impairment in recalling, imaging, identifying, and visualizing facial 
and emotional expressions. Electrical stimulation of the right (but not left) middle temporal
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gyrus also results in an inability to correctly label the emotion shown in faces (Joseph, 1996).
Kolb and Whishaw (1996) reference a study by Cicone and associates who asked 
patients to match a target scene such as a man being robbed, with one o f four other scenes 
that displayed the same emotion. Right hemisphere patients were more impaired than left 
hemisphere patients on both visual and verbal forms o f the test. Using positron emission 
tomography (PET) George etal. (1996) documented increased activity in the right prefirontal 
cortex during detection o f emotional prosody expressed in sentences. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging techniques (fMRI) on ten right-handed males with no history 
o f  neurological or audiological illness, Buchanan et al. (2000) found that the auditory 
detection o f emotion compared with simple verbal detection resulted in significant activity 
in the right inferior fi-ontal lobe.
In his review o f studies that exemplify this view, Pinel (1997) found that right 
temporal and/or parietal lobe lesions produce talking in individuals that is characterized by 
excessive concern for their personal lives. For example, these patients have been found to 
exhibit paranoia that the family and firiends are against them or don’t believe them. 
Conversely, left lesions reduce talking and are associated with positive emotion. In addition, 
localized damage to the fi^ontal lobes have been shown to hinder the production o f facial 
expression.
The first systematic study to investigate the contrasting behavioral and emotional 
effects resulting fi-om brain damage was done by Gainotti (1969). This study showed that 
catastrophic reactions occurred in 62% of his left hemisphere sample compared with only 
10% of the right hemisphere sample. In contrast, indifference was found in 38% of right
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hemisphere patients and 11% of left hemisphere cases. Later on, Gainotti (1972) evaluated 
a group o f hémiplégies to evaluate absence o f emotional response (anosognosia) and 
depression. Significant hemispheric differences were found. Many more right hemisphere 
damage patients showed some form o f anosognosia, while a greater number of those with left 
hemisphere damage showed some degree of depression. From this, it was suggested that the 
emotional responses o f the two hemispheres were different. Subsequent investigations have 
suggested that the right hemisphere can be considered dominant for emotion in the human, 
analogous to left hemisphere dominance for language (Bear, 1983). Thus, it has been 
supported that severe damage to the left hemisphere can lead to an emotional response 
(depression) while damage to the right hemisphere can produce anosognosia (Benson, 1984).
In addition to the focus of study on the localization and lateralization o f emotional 
processes, there have been a concentration of studies on the effects of brain damage on 
perception o f affective stimuli. Recognition of emotion expressed either visually or vocally 
has been shown to be poor in patients with right hemisphere damage (Heihnan, Scholes & 
Watson, 1975). Kolb and Taylor (1981) examined the effects of cortical excision upon the 
perception of emotion in facial expression, the perception of emotion in verbal expression, 
and the spontaneous production o f conversational speech. The first part of the study involved 
showing the patient seven key photographs of sadness, fear, happiness, anger, disgust, 
surprise and interest. The subj ect was then shown 24 photographs out of a magazine and was 
asked to match each to the appropriate key emotion picture. Those with right hemisphere 
lesions had impairment in matching the different faces displaying similar emotional states. 
In patients with unilateral focal excisions of frontal, temporal, or parieto-occipital cortex it
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was found that lesions of the left hemisphere impaired the matching o f verbal description to 
appropriate verbal categories of emotional states.
Kolb and Taylor (1981) observed a large reduction in spontaneous facial expression 
in patients with left or right fi-ontal-lobe lesions, compared with patients with temporal- or 
parietal-lobe lesions. This is in contrast to the increased talking o f the right-frontal-lobe 
lesion patients. The limited spontaneous talking o f the patients with left Jftontal-lobe lesions 
supports previous reports on the impoverishment of spontaneous narrative speech. The 
fi-equent spontaneous talking  of the right firontal lobe patients can probably be ascribed to the 
tendency o f  right fi’ontal lesions to produce impulsiveness and rule-breaking behavior.
On the basis o f studies of neurological and psychiatric patients it has been proposed 
that the right hemisphere plays a special role in the production o f affective behavior and the 
perception of socially relevant stimuli such as facial expression and affective tone in voices 
(Lowick, 1995). Facial recognition is suggested to be identified in the amygdala, superior 
temporal sulcus, inferior temporal visual cortex, parietal cortex, and fi'ontal cortex (Perrett, 
Rolls & Caan, 1982). Dysfimction of the facial recognition system may not only represent 
a perceptual deficit but may directly translate into behavioral alterations, perhaps via 
amygdala projections to cortical regions (e.g., orbitofirontal cortex) believed important in 
behavioral regulation (Rubinow& Post, 1992). Although face-responsive neurons have been 
identified in both hemispheres and facial perception appears to occur bilaterally, facial 
recognition shows hemispheric asymmetry with right hemisphere preference (Marzd, 
Tassinari, Tressoldi, Barry & Grabowska, 1985).
A study by Braun, Deneault, Cohen and Rouleau (1994) was aimed at determining
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the extent to which lobectomy affects ability to discriminate facial identity or facial 
expression. They employed a facial identity matching task and a facial affect matching task. 
In general, the lobectomized patients were significantly impaired on both tasks. The site of 
lobectomy did not selectively influence performance on any one task, and it was concluded 
that all four brain regions (right/left temporal and right/left firontal) play equal roles in face 
processing, and that circuits more specifically dedicated to visual face processing, are 
probably located more posteriorly in the brain.
Overall, there is strong agreement that the temporal cortex plays a more important 
role in discrimination of facial identity and facial affect than do more posterior regions of the 
brain (Braun et al., 1994). In addition, temporal patients were more abnormal than frontal 
patients on a perceptual categorization task involving facial stimuli (Kolb, Milner &  Taylor, 
1983).
There is controversy regarding the valence of facial expressions and whether one 
hemisphere is dominant over the other depending on whether the emotions to be 
discriminated are positive or negative (Lowick, 1995; Reuter-Lorenz & Davidson, 1983; 
Sackheim, Greenberg, Weinman, Gur, Hungerbuhler & Geschwind, 1983). Braun et al. 
(1994) found that the cortex o f the fi'ontal lobes may contribute to various aspects o f facial 
perception, including categorization o f emotions and o f identity o f faces. In addition, it 
appears that this frontal contribution is not different from the temporal contribution. The 
processing o f negative emotions was more impaired than positive emotions on both the FTE 
(facial test o f emotion) and the CTE (contextual task o f emotion).
Jackson and Moffat (1987) found that closed head-injured (CHI) patients are
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impaired at identifying facial expressions. Identification of negative emotions was 
significantly more impaired than identification o f positive emotions on a  task similar to the 
FTE as weU as on a task requiring subjects to label the emotion best representative of a given 
body posture.
Empathy
Mead (1934) suggested that role-taking ability is the key variable in social 
functioning and that social sensitivity has origins in the central nervous system. In a similar 
vein, recent research has adopted the multifaceted definition o f empathy and has focused on 
the neurological processes involved in empathy and its production (Eslinger, 1998; Grattan 
1994; Scott, Young, Calder, & Hellawell, 1997). However, the consequences of cerebral 
damage on performance on empathie measures have only recently begun to be studied. In 
a study by Eslinger, Satish and Grattan (1998) on the effects o f acquired cerebral damage on 
performance on affectively- and cognitively-based measures, it was found that cerebral 
damage affected both types of empathy scores (emotional and cognitive).
Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (1990) in their study o f patient EVR (who sustained 
damage to ventromedial firontal cortices) found that the bifrontal subject failed to generate 
somatic activation (via skin conductance) to socially significant stimuli. From this it can be 
inferred that empathie ability was compromised, as the prerequisite (recognizing socially 
significant stimuli) was not present
In normal individuals, the ventromedial fi-ontal cortices receive signals firom various 
neural structures engaged in perception (visual, olfaction, audition, internal visceral and 
skeletal states). These signals arrive in the orbital region via multi-stage projections firom
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higher-order association cortices in temporal, parietal, and cortical regions (Pinel, 1997). 
Furthermore the ventromedial firontal cortices are the only known source o f projections fi'om 
firontal regions towards central autonomic control structures (Chavis & Pandya, 1976; Jones 
& Powell, 1970;Nauta, 1971). Damasio etal. (1990) propose that the ventromedial fi'ontal 
cortices serve two purposes: to modulate incoming external and internal stimuli; and to 
activate somatic effectors in the amygdala, hypothalamus, and brainstem nuclei.
Disruptions to the aforementioned prefirontal regions cause profound disturbances in 
how people relate to others (Eslinger, 1998). Grattan, Bloomer, Archambault and Eslinger
(1994) conducted a study aimed at finding a relationship between impairments in 
interpersonal functioning and cognitive flexibility (being able to generate and consider ideas 
and different response possibilities as well as in choice o f behavioral responses and 
understanding of others) in individuals with fi'ontal lobe injury. Based on the established 
notion that adult patients with acquired brain injury obtain significantly lower scores on an 
empirical measure o f empathy compared to normal controls (Grattan and Eslinger, 1989) it 
was their hypothesis that there would be a positive correlation between measures of cognitive 
flexibility and empathy in subjects who sustained fi'ontal lobe lesions in the dorsolateral, 
mesial or orbital sectors. The results indicated that empathy level was found to be 
significantly correlated with measures o f cognitive flexibility supporting the hypothesis that 
the impairment in flexible thinking could represent a cognitive underpinning for alterations 
in empathy. Interestingly, it was found that left and right dorsolateral lesions caused 
significant impairment in cognitive flexibility and empathy. Grattan and Eslinger suggest that 
lack of empathy may have a cognitive basis in deficient flexibility o f thinking. Overall, the
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findings o f this study support a model of functional-anatomic distinctions within the firontal 
lobe that encompasses cognitive and noncognitive mechanisms within a network o f cerebral 
structures subserving complex social processes.
In a follow-up of the aforementioned study, Eslinger (1998) found significant 
correlations (.5-.6) between cognitive flexibility measures and empathy scores. Patients with 
acquired focal lesions of the firontal lobe in the dorsolateral region were found to have 
impaired empathy and cognitive flexibility suggesting that cognitive impairments limit 
ability to perceive, understand and interact adaptively with others. However, patients with 
orbitofi-ontal lesions exhibited normal cognitive flexibility but impaired empathy. 
Specifically, these patients would describe social matters accurately but would not guide their 
behavior in a socially acceptable way. Frontal lesion patients who had normal empathy 
scores experienced a more positive social and vocational outcome than patients with reduced 
empathy scores. These patterns of findings on the effects of different firontal lobe lesions 
lead to the notion that there might be an anatomic-functional correlation between dorsolateral 
fi-ontal systems and predominantly cognitive aspects of empathie processing and orbitofirontal 
systems and emotional empathie processing.
Brain Injury and Emotion Recognition
Recovered brain injured patients often remain chronically compromised in then- 
social relations (Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990; Grattan & Eslinger, 1992; Weddel, 
1980) and emotional stability (Levin, Grossman, Rose & Teasdale, 1979; O’Hara, C., 1988). 
It is generally agreed that these problems are among the most persistent and the most 
handicapping o f all for CHI patients (Braun et al., 1989). Relatives of HI patients consider
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the emotional changes (e.g., anxiety, childish behavior, depression) to be greater burdens 
than either their physical or cognitive impairments (Brooks & Aughton, 1979).
Following damage to ventromedial frontal cortices, adults with previously normal 
personalities develop abnormal social conduct and inadequate decision-making and planning 
that repeatedly lead to negative consequences. Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (1990) discuss 
the case study o f patient EVR who had surgical resection of an orbitofrontal meningioma. 
Prior to this, EVR was a successful professional, husband and father. Following the 
ablation, EVR exhibited the prototypical pathology associated with such brain injury. 
Although his performance on IQ and memory tests remained in the superior range, his social 
conduct met the criteria for sociopathic disorder in the third edition o f the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual. Although EVR could solve hypothetical ethical problems, when faced 
with such a problem in a real-life setting, he was unable to generate appropriate solutions.
It is possible that an impaired ability to recognize emotions accurately (Braun et al., 
1989) may be a significant factor in the chain of events which produce maladaptive social 
and emotional behavior (Jackson & Moffat, 1987). Neuropsychological studies of emotional 
recognition indicate the specific involvement of the right hemisphere in the expression, 
understanding and storage o f affective information. In their study o f brain injury patients 
and emotional recognition, Jackson and Moffat (1987) report that the head injured group 
(15 right-handed males; average time since injury = 6.5 years) were more impaired on the 
recognition of negative emotions than positive emotions. No relationship between age, 
verbal IQ and emotional recognition could be found in either subject group.
Young, Aggleton, Hellawell and Johnson (1995) investigated face processing
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impairments in a 51 year old female with a partial bilateral amygdalotomy. Prior to the 
surgery, the subject was able to recognize familiar faces. Following the operation however, 
she had generalized difficulties with name retrieval of familiar faces. In contrast, her ability 
to match simultaneously presented photographs o f unfamiliar faces was unimpaired. Also 
experienced were deficits in the recognition of emotion in people’s faces. This confirms that 
the amygdala plays a role in learning and social behavior.
Borod, Cicero, Obler, Welkowitz, Erhan, etal. (1998) examined emotional perception 
in stroke patients (11 right-brain-damaged (RBD) and 10 left-brain-damaged (LBD)) across 
3 communication channels: facial, prosodic, and lexical. Hemispheric specialization for 
emotion was tested via right-hemisphere (RH) and valence hypotheses, and relationships 
among channels was determined. RBD participants were significantly more impaired in 
identification tasks than LBD.
In sum, it is generally agreed upon that the social and behavioral implications of CHI 
are significant. It is suggested that impairment in recognition of facial affect is a major 
contributing factor to this outcome. Studies have shown that there seems to be greater 
impairment in recognizing negative emotion rather than positive emotions. Also, it has been 
shown that the amygdala plays a role in emotion recognition and that RBD (more than LBD) 
may result in decreased ability to identify emotion.
Brain Injury and Empathy
Significant disturbances of higher cognition and social behavior are often disabling 
consequences o f damage to the fi-ontal lobes (Grattan & Eslinger, 1992). The classic 
example o f Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1868), the young railroad worker who acquired a massive
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frontal lobe lesion, illustrates the effects that such damage can have on social adaptation and 
development. While this and other case examples illustrates the profound and pervasive 
effects that CHI can have, there is little information available regarding the long-term 
consequences o f childhood frontal lobe lesion. One of the first such studies was done by 
Grattan and Eslinger (1992) with patient DT.
DT sustained damage in the left frontal cortex and white matter. There were no 
observable abnormalities in the right frontal lobe. A  single photon emission tomography 
(SPECT) study revealed abnormally low bilateral cerebral blood flow. Extensive evaluation 
indicated significant impairments in self-regulation and executive functioning. This included 
difficulty in sustained attention and concentration, lack of cognitive flexibility, difficulty in 
planning and regulation o f  goal-directed activity, and poor environmental judgements. DT 
obtained a very low score on the Empathy Measure (total =  27, - 2 SD) suggesting that she 
had difficulty understanding another person’s situation. Her MMPI profile indicated an 
atypical pattern of responses, associated with a chronic history of social maladjustment.
In sum, the long-term result of childhood CHI as exhibited in DT illustrates a 
persistent pattern o f disturbed psychological development and adaptive social behavior 
leaving her unable to acquire particular psychosocial skills beyond the level of early 
adolescence.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is twofold:
I. To expand on the study by Lowick (1995) determining whether individuals with
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brain injury exhibit deficits in emotion recognition (as detected by the VERT) and in 
emotional and cognitive empathy (as measured by the EM and QMEE, respectively). It is 
hypothesized that individuals with brain injury will have lower scores (as compared to the 
normal control group) on the subscales o f  the VERT as well as on the EM and QMEE.
2. Provided these deficits exist, the relationship between empathy and emotion 
recognition will be analysed. It is hypothesized that individuals who have deficits in emotion 
recognition will have deficits in both forms of empathy and those without deficits in emotion 
recognition (i.e., normal controls) will have an intact ability to empathize.
Method
Subjects
This study employed two subject groups: a brain-injured sample and a control group. 
The brain-injured individuals were recruited on a voluntary basis firom Brain Injury Services 
o f Northern Ontario (BISNO) and St. Joseph’s Hospital. The 20 participants in this group 
included 14 males and 6 females. (A detailed description of the brain injury group can be 
found in the results section.) The control group (8 males and 14 females) were recruited firom 
two Lakehead University undergraduate psychology classes. Students who participated 
earned 3% toward their final grade.
Participants were screened (via questionnaire) for confounding variables such as:
1) Language: The ability to understand English (in written or verbal form) was 
required due to the nature o f the test instructions and questionnaires.
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2) Vision; Individuals who were visually impaired to the extent that they could not 
see aspects o f the VERT were not included in the study.
3) Cultural background: The cultural and/or ethnic background of the individuals was 
noted in the demographic form. A post hoc analysis o f cultural differences in: judgements 
o f  type and intensity o f  facial expression, interpretation o f and emotional/cognitive reactions 
to social situations was conducted.
4) Etiology o f  brain-injury: The experimental subject group was restricted primarily 
to those who sustained traumatic brain injury at least 1 year prior to testing.
5) Prior mild head injuries in control group: Individuals who had previously 
sustained a moderate to severe degree of concussion were not included.
All participants met the requirements of these criteria.
Assessment Measures 
Emotion Recognition Test 
VERT
The Victoria Emotion Recognition Test (VERT; Appendix A) was developed by 
Mountain (1993). It is a  measure that can be useful for the measurement o f failures in 
recognition o f emotion as well as to study the function o f recognition o f emotion. The test 
involves the simultaneous presentation of pairs o f photographs (visual chaimel), pairs of 
voice clips (auditory channel) and a combination o f the two (visual-auditory channel). The 
emotions o f anger, happiness, sadness and fear are presented at mild, moderate and severe 
levels on each chaimel. The subjects are required to determine whether the emotions 
portrayed in each pair were the same or different, name the emotions, judge the intensities
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as the same or different, and indicated the intensity level o f  each emotion depicted.
Empathy Scales
Hogan Empathv Scale ŒM1
Hogan’s Empathy Scale (EM; Appendix B), completed in 1969, was designed to 
measure the ability o f  an individual to “put himself in another person’s shoes.” According 
to Hogan’s conception of empathy, people who are more empathie should be more socially 
aware, better adjusted, and more caring about the feelings o f others (Hogan, 1969). His 
definition o f social acuity is related to his definition of empathy in that highly empathie 
subjects are more aware o f the environment than those with low empathy. Because empathy 
plays a central role in many phases of social psychology, Hogan (1969) felt that a valid and 
easily administered measure would be useful. Up until this point, there had been a variety 
of attempts to create such a measure, however, most had not received stellar reviews. For 
example, the earlier measures such as the Empathy Test (Kerr, 1947), the Test o f Social 
Insight (Cassel, 1963) and the Chapin Social Insight Test (Chapin, 1942) raised 
methodological questions by reviewers (e.g., Chlopan, 1985) and lacked validity.
The 64 items of Hogan’s Empathy Scale include 31 firom the California Personality 
Inventoryl, 25 firom the MMPI and 8 firom various experimental testing forms used in studies 
at Berkeley. Hogan used 100 military officers, 45 research scientists and 66 student 
engineers in designing the questionnaire. With the Q sort description o f each person, they 
were each given an empathy rating. Further, the empathy ratings were correlated in each 
sample with the standard scales o f the the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 
1964) the MMPI and the Chapin Social Insight Test. Through item-analysis of the
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responses of the high-rated versus the low-rated groups v/ere compared and using the chi- 
square and the Fisher’s exact statistic, 64 o f the 957-item pool were selected (32 true, 32 
false).
Hogan reports a correlation of .58 between social acuity and empathy (Chlopan, 
1985). The EM has been used to assess empathy in relation to a number o f  personality 
variables, such as anxiety, locus o f control, autonomy and socialization. Chlopan (1985) 
reported that those who scored higher on the EM were less anxious and better adjusted (e.g., 
finding inverse relationships with the phobic cluster, obsessiveness, and depression). Further 
support for the negative relation between the EM scale and anxiety comes fi-om Davis’ 
(1983) personal distress subscale. In sum, the studies relating empathy to personality 
variables have generally shown that the highly empathie individual (as measured on the EM/ 
Hogan scale) is less anxious, less depressed and generally better adjusted than their less 
empathie counterpart (Chlopan, 1985). Empathie subjects also seem to have less discrepancy 
between self-ratings, test scores, and peer ratings o f femininity, social insight, and empathy 
than do nonempathic subjects (Mills & Hogan, 1978). It is notable that, regardless of 
whether patients rated themselves or family members rated them, reports indicate similar 
scores on the EM (Bardenhagen, Bowden, Shields, McKay, Smith, Vogrin, Collins & Cook, 
1999; Eslinger, 1998).
The Questionnaire Measure o f  Emotional Empathv /QMEE)
Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) advanced the notion that although there is a cognitive 
component involved in empathy, in their view, it is the lack o f an adequate emotional 
processing component that results in an inability to be empathetic (Mehrabian & Epstein,
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1972).
The QMEE (Appendix C) is a 33-item test in which the respondent answers each item 
on a scale from very strong disagreement (-4) to very strong agreement (+4). This measure 
includes seven intercorrelated subscales. In personality studies using QMEE, empathy was 
found to correlate significantly with a measure o f social interest suggesting that highly 
empathie people have the ability to become aroused by others in distress, a factor that 
probably plays a large role in positive social encounters (Chlopan, 1985). Highly empathie 
individuals tend to show a great amount o f social concern and tend to screen irrelevant 
environmental information less. In another study, it was shown that individuals who 
expressed their reaction to a situation with facial expression scored higher on the empathy 
scale (Chlopan, 1985).
Upon critical review of measures of empathy, only two scales, the QMEE and 
Hogan’s EM scale have a number of studies supporting their validity and reliability 
(Chlopan, 1985 ; Eslinger, 1998). These measures involve two different aspects of empathy; 
the literature on the QMEE indicates that it is measuring vicarious emotional arousal and 
may even be tapping a general tendency to be arousable in various situations, whereas the 
literature on the EM indicates that this scale is measuring role-taking ability and may even 
be tapping an aspect of adequate social functioning. Eslinger’s study on the 
multidimensional nature o f empathy in brain-injured subjects (1998) employed the QMEE 
and EM as valid measures o f the emotional and cognitive forms of empathy. Taken 
together, these two scales measure empathy as the ability to (a) become emotionally aroused 
to the distress of another and (b) take the other person’s point of view, in order to have true
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empathy. If  one accepts these definitions o f empathy then these two scales seem to provide 
a basis for the measurements of empathy.
Procedure
Prior to testing, the relevant methods and details of the study were explained to the 
participants and the consent form (Appendix D) was read and signed. Participants were 
given a participant number and then asked to complete the Demographic Sheet (Appendix 
E). Participants who had difficulty reading or writing were administered the demographic 
questions orally. Following this, all participants were administered the VERT. To control 
for sequencing effects, the administration of the QMEE and the EM was counterbalanced. 
Because the majority o f the brain injury group had difficulty reading (i.e., poor vision, 
problems with reading comprehension, slow processing speed) each participant was given 
a copy of the test to follow along as it was read to them. Upon completion o f testing, each 
participant was debriefed and offered the opportunity to receive a summary o f the results 
which would be mailed to them when available. The entire procedure took, on average, 50 
minutes for the control group and 90 minutes for the brain injury group.
Results
Group Descriptions
A total of 42 participants completed the test session: 22 undergraduate students and 
20 individuals who had sustained brain injvuy. All participants met the inclusion criteria.
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The control group consisted of 8 males and 14 females. They ranged in age firom 19 to 30 
(M = 22.73, SD = 1.13), with an education range o f 14 to 17 years (M = 15 years). There 
were 20 right-handed participants (7 males, 13 females) and 2 left-handed participants (1 
male, 1 female).
The brain-injured group consisted o f 14 males and 6 females. They ranged in age 
fi-om 18 to 54 (M = 36.7, SD = 10.44), with an education range o f 12 to 17 years (M =13  
years). There were 16 right-handed participants (11 males, 5 females) and 4 left-handed 
participants (3 male, 1 female). The average number of years post-injury was 6.03 (range = 
1 to 26 years).
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Table 1. Description of participants with brain injury.








101 35 M Right 4 Physical
attack
1 '/2  months 3 months
102 34 M Right 26 Impaled by 
rod
n/a 1 day
103 33 M Right 2 Drug
overdose
2 months IViyrs
104 22 M Right 4 MVA Smooths 1 months
105 41 M Left 4 MVA 5 days 4 months
106 45 M Left 6 Motorcycle
accident
15 days 5 months
107 18 M Right 5 Bicycle
accident
24 hrs IV2  months
108 50 M Right 11 Physical
attack
10 days 3 months
109 44 M Right VA MVA 4 months 6 months
110 30 M Right 12 MVA 8 months 2 yrs
111 36 M Left 3 Physical
attack
7 weeks 2 yrs
112 40 F Right 8 MVA 314 weeks 1314 months
113 39 M Right 3 '/2 MVA 0 2 months
114 29 F Right 3 MVA 1 day 2 14 months
115 43 F Right 5 ‘/2 Aneurysm 0 2 weeks
116 44 M Right 1 ‘/2 MVA 0 <1 day
117 54 M Right 5 '/2 Plane crash 0 3 days
118 20 F Right 4 '/2 MVA 7 days 5 months
119 25 F Right 9 MVA 6 ‘/2  weeks 6 months
120 52 F Left 1 Stroke 0 3 weeks
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Rrain-Iniurv Group Versus Control Group 
The primary measures o f interest in the present study were the Victoria Emotion 
Recognition Test (VERT), Hogan’s Empathy Measure (EM) and Mehrabian and Epstein’s 
Questionnaire Measure o f Emotional Empathy (QMEE). One main purpose for conducting 
this study was to determine whether deficits in emotion recognition and emotional and 
cognitive empathy (as measured by the aforementioned tests) are present in individuals who 
have sustained brain injury, and further, to identify the extent, i f  any, of such impairment. 
The other conceptual question o f this study was to determine the nature of the relationship 
between empathy and emotion recognition. It was hypothesized that individuals with brain 
injury would attain lower scores the VERT, EM and QMEE. Further, it was postulated that 
those with emotion recognition difficulties would have deficits in empathie responding and 
those without deficits in emotion recognition (i.e., normal controls) would have an intact 
ability to empathize. The following sections deal with these questions.
VERT Scores
As previously indicated, the VERT is a test o f an individual’s ability to recognize and 
identify dichotically presented emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) and their 
intensities as they are presented in the form of a picture or audio clips. The \T2RT has nine 
possible outcome scores: total visual channel, total auditory chaimel, total visual/auditory 
channels, match emotions, identify emotions, match intensities, identify intensities, overall 
total, and total time to complete the test. Using SPSS for Windows (Version 9), independent 
samples t-tests were performed to compare the brain-injury and control groups on these nine
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VERT scores (see Table 2a and 2b). The control group performed significantly better (p’s 
< .002) on all nine scores indicating that overall, the control group was better able to 
recognize and identify emotions and their intensity across both the visual and auditory 
chaimels.
Empathy scores
As previously discussed, two measures o f empathy were used in this study: Hogan’s 
Empathy Measure (EM), which is said to target the cognitive aspects of empathy and the 
Questiomiaire Measure o f Emotional Empathy (QMEE), which is intended to measure 
capacity for emotional empathy. Results firom SPSS ANOVA are indicated in the following 
sections.
Independent samples t-tests were performed to compare the brain-injury and control 
group on their EM scores (see Table 3). In contrast to the brain-injury group, the control 
group (M = 41.77, SD = 5.94) performed significantly better on the EM (t (40) = 4.52, p < 
.001) than the brain injury group (M = 33.55, SD = 5.83).
QMEE
Overall comparison o f the groups using independent samples t-tests on the QMEE 
did not reveal significant differences (t (40) = 1.79, p  = . 081) between the control group (M 
= 38.0, SD = 24.09) and the brain injury group (M = 23.7, SD = 27.65) (see Table 4).
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Table 2(a). Group Statistics for VERT Scores





TOTAL no 22 48.64 4.32 .92
VISUAL yes 20 42.10 5.82 1.30
TOTAL no 22 49.00 4.51 .96
AUDITORY yes 20 39.90 6.85 1.53
TOTAL no 22 52.09 5.81 1.24
VIS/AUD yes 20 41.60 6.77 1.51
GRAND no 22 149.73 10.72 2.29
TOTAL yes 20 123.60 14.69 3.29
MATCH no 22 27.50 2.72 .58
EMOTION yes 20 24.90 2.47 .55
IDENTIFY no 22 57.27 4.39 .94
EMOTION yes 20 46.65 7.21 1.61
MATCH no 22 23.18 3.06 .65
INTENSITY yes 20 19.35 3.53 .79
IDENTIFY no 22 41.77 4.75 1.01
INTENSITY yes 20 32.70 6.10 1.36
MINUTES no 22 15.3182 3.1227 .6658
yes 20 23.7500 6.8739 1.5370




Variances t-test for Eoualitv of Means



















































10.8 .002 -5.198 40 .000 -8.4318 1.6220 -11.710 -5.153
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Table 3(a). Group Statistics for EM Scores





EM no 22 41.77 5.94 1.27
yes 20 33.55 5.83 1.30
Table 3(b). Independent Samples Test for EM Scores
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Eauaiiti/ of Means















.075 .786 4.520 40 .000 8.22 1.82 4.55 11.90
Table 4(a). Group Statistics for QMEE Scores





QMEE no 22 38.00 24.09 5.14
yes 20 23.70 27.65 6.18
Table 4(b). Independent Samples Test for QMEE Scores
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Eaualiti/ of Means















.253 .617 1.791 40 .081 14.30 7.99 -1.84 30.44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Brain-Injuiy, Emotion Recognition and Empathy 46
A Relationship Between Emotion Recognition and Empathy 
While the first hypothesis was found to hold true for the VERT and EM, it did not 
for the QMEE. Specifically, the brain injury group differed fi-om the normal control group 
with lower scores on the emotion recognition and cognitive empathy, however, no 
differences were observed between the groups on the emotional measure of empathy. To 
address the second conceptual issue, bivariate correlations between the measures were 
performed. The EM was found to correlate significantly (p < .05) on the following subscales 
o f the VERT: total visual chaimel (r = .527), total visual/auditory channel combined (r = 
.454), the overall VERT score (r =  .503), identification of emotion (r =  .54), and 
identification o f intensity (r = .483). The QMEE did not, however, correlate with any o f the 
subscales on the VERT. In a bivariate correlation analysis of the two empathy measures, 
scores on the QMEE and the EM were found to correlate for the brahi injury group (r = .576, 
p < .01) and for both groups combined (r = .472, p < .01), but not for the control group (r = 
.224).
Demographics and Dependent Variables.
Bivariate correlations o f the nine VERT scores, the EM and the QMEE were made 
with the demographic variables of age, education, gender, and handedness. As is depicted 
in Table 5, there was only one significant correlation, which occurred between gender and 
the QMEE in the brain injury group (r = .574, p < .01).
































Table 5. Bivariate correlations for coiitrol/brain injury groups on outcome measures with demographic factors.
AGE EDUC GENDER HAND
HOGAN Pearson 
Correlation
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Gender Effects
It remains, however, that the two groups differ in gender and it is therefore important 
to explore whether this demographic variable might have been responsible for the group 
differences reported alone. To test this, independent samples t-tests were examined within 
and between each group on each outcome measure.
Within Groups
Males and females were compared within gender and within each group on the EM, 
QMEE and the nine VERT scores with SPSS ANOVA procedures. Means and standard 
deviations for all participants on each measure are presented in Table 6 (a). There were no 
significant differences between males and females in the control group on any o f the 
measures (see Table 6(b)) . Similarly, males and females in the brain injured group did not 
differ on the VERT scores or the EM, however, there was a significant difference on the 
QMEE (t (18) = -2.97, p < .05) with females (M = 47.33, SD = 27.41) performing 
significantly better than the males (M = 13.57, SD = 21.46) (see Table 6(c)).
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Table 6(K). independent Samples Test for the Comparison of Males vs. Females in the Control Group
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 








Interval of the 
Difference
F Siq. t df Lower Upper
HOGAN Equal variances 




assumed .314 .581 -1.453 20 .162 -15.13 10.41 -36.83 6.58
TOTVlSU Equal variances 
assumed .199 .660 1.239 20 .230 2.34 1.89 -1.60 6.28
TOTAUDIT Equal variances 
assumed .565 .461 .580 20 .569 1.18 2.03 -3.06 5.42
TOVISAUD Equal variances 
assumed 2.034 .169 .169 20 .867 .45 2.54 -5.06 5.95
GRANDTOT Equal variances 
assumed .935 .345 .828 20 .417 3.96 4.79 -6.02 13.95
MATCHEM Equal variances 
assumed .251 .622 1.900 20 .072 2.16 1.14 -.21 4.53
IDEMOT Equal variances 
assumed 1.258 .275 1.207 20 .242 2.32 1.92 -1.69 6.33
MATCHINT. Equal variances 
assumed .305 .587 .648 20 .524 .89 1.38 -1.98 3.77
IDINTEN Equal variances 




assumed .792 .384 .481 20 .636 .6786 1.4100 -2.2627 3.6198
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Table 6(c): Independent Samples Test for Comparison of Males vs. Females in the Brain Injury Group
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 








Interval of the 
Difference
F Siq. t df Lower Upper
HOGAN Equal variances 
assumed 8.189 .010 -1.735 18 .100 -4.69 2.70 -10.37 .99
QMEE Equal variances 
assumed .144 .708 -2.974 18 .008 -33.76 11.35 -57.61 -9.91
TOTVlSU Equal variances 
assumed 3.379 .083 -.360 18 .723 -1.05 2.91 -7.16 5.06
TOTAUDIT Equal variances 
assumed .836 .373 .952 18 .354 3.19 3.35 -3.85 10.23
TOVISAUD Equal variances 
assumed .040 .844 -1.437 18 .168 -4.62 3.21 -11.37 2.13
GRANDTOT Equal variances 
assumed .511 .484 -.337 18 .740 -2.48 7.34 -17.90 12.95
MATCHEM Equal variances 
assumed .578 .457 .662 18 .516 .81 1.22 -1.76 3.38
IDEMOT Equal variances 
assumed .017 .898 -.742 18 .468 -2.64 3.56 -10.13 4.84
MATCHINT Equal variances 
assumed .067 .798 .696 18 .496 1.21 1.75 -2.45 4.88
IDINTEN Equal variances 
assumed .545 .470 -.614 18 .547 -1.86 3.02 -8.21 4.50
"TÎÏUt'-TÔ Equal variances 
assumed .652 .430 .173 18 .865 .5952 3.4432 -6.6386 7.8290
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Between groups 
VERT
Closer inspection o f these results indicate that males in the control group performed 
significantly better than males in the brain-injury group on all scores (p < .05). Similarly 
females in the control group performed significantly better than females in the brain-injury 
group on all scores (p < .05).
EM
In comparing within gender between groups it was found that the males in the 
control group (M = 43.00, SD = 4.84) performed significantly better than the males in the 
brain-injury group (M = 32.14, SD =6.43) on the EM (t (20) = 4.136, p = .001). There was 
no difference found amongst females’ scores on the EM between the two groups (t (18) = 
1.54, p = .141).
QMEE
Within gender comparison between the control and the brain injury group did not 
elucidate the mechanism o f why gender was significantly correlated with the QMEE in the 
brain injury group. While both sexes in the control group scored higher means than their 
counterparts in the brain inj ury group, this difference did not reach significance (males : t (20) 
= 1.55, p = .138; females: t  (18) =  -0.312, p = .759).
Altogether, the correlations suggest that while the groups differ demographically 
these differences (most notably that of gender) do not seem to contribute to the overall group 
differences on the outcome measures.
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Summary
To summarize, two groups (a control group and a group who have sustained brain 
injury) were administered three tests: the EM, the QMEE and the VERT. Using SPSS, 
statistical analyses were performed to compare the two groups on the three outcome 
measures. While the groups appeared to be heterogeneous on the demographic factors of 
age, education, gender and handedness, these factors did not appear to play a direct role in 
the results of the tests as indicated by bivariate correlations and ANCOVA. It is postulated 
that these factors (i.e., lower education, larger proportion of males) are, however, 
representative o f the brain injury population (this wiU be addressed in the discussion section). 
In the overall comparison o f groups, independent t-tests revealed a significant difference on 
the EM (t(40) = 4.52, p < .001) and the VERT (p < .05 on all nine scores, see Table 2(b) for 
t-scores). There was not, however, a significant difference between groups on the QMEE 
(t(40) = 1.791, p = .081). Bivariate correlations showed that EM and most o f the VERT 
subscales were significantly correlated but the QMEE and VERT were not correlated. 
Further, significant correlations were found for combined group scores on the EM and 
QMEE but not when the scores for the control group were analyzed separately.
To elucidate the role of gender in the overall scores independent samples t-tests for 
between gender within groups and for within gender between groups were performed. The 
t-test for the comparison o f males versus females within groups revealed no significant 
differences on any of the scores between males and females in the control group. When 
comparing males versus females in the brain injury group it was observed that there were no 
significant differences on the EM and VERT scores, but there was a significant difference, 
with females performing better than males, on the QMEE (t(18) = -2.974, p < .05).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Brain-injury, Emotion Recognition and Empathy 54 
Discussion
The purpose of this study was twofold: First, to determine whether brain injury 
patients exhibited deficits in emotion recognition (as detected by the VERT) and in 
emotional and cognitive empathy, (as measured by the EM and QMEE, respectively); 
second, provided these deficits exist, to determine whether the scores on the ability to 
recognize emotions covary with the scores on the ability to express empathy. The following 
two sections outline the results o f the present study in relation to previous findings on 
deficits in empathy and emotion recognition in brain-injured samples. Following this, the 
results for both cognitive phenomena are integrated and discussed relative to their 
implications to the research literature as well as their relevance to clinical practice. Finally, 
comments regarding limitations to the present design are made and suggestions for the path 
o f future research are advanced.
Empathy
As previously described, this study targeted two forms o f empathy: cognitive 
empathy, as measured by the EM, and emotional empathy as measured by the QMEE. 
Results indicate that there was an overall difference between the groups on the EM. While 
there was no within group gender difference found, between group differences were seen 
when comparing males (control scores exceeding brain injury group scores) but not when 
comparing females on the EM. The findings for the present control group (M =  41.77, SD 
= 5.94) are comparable to those found by Hogan (1969).
With respect to the comparison of the EM data firom the brain injured group (M = 
33.55, SD = 5.94) to previous research, it is seen that Bardenhagen et al. (1999) report
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similar EM scores for two male patients. The present EM findings are somewhat higher than 
those reported by Grattan et al. (1994): firontal brain injury M = 27.17, SD = 3.27; nonfrontal 
brain injmy M = 27.55, SD =2.79.
With respect to the scores on the QMEE, there was no overall difference observed 
between the groups. When looking at differences in scores between males and females on 
the QMEE within the groups, no difference was found in the control group, but there was a 
difference within the brain injury group as the females had higher scores o f emotional 
empathy than the males. No between group differences were found (i.e., males in control 
group did not differ significantly firom those in the B1 group, and likewise for females). In 
comparison to Mehrabian and Epstein’s normative data (1972) it is evident that their mean 
scores, (males: M = 23, SD = 22; females: M = 44, SD = 21) are very close to those obtained 
for the control group in the present study (males: M = 28.38, SD = 21.86; females M = 43.5, 
SD = 24.31.). In contrast to the two case studies presented by Bardenhagen et al. (1999), the 
males (in the present brain injury group) generated much lower scores than HB (M = 43), and 
NL (M = 36). No studies were found to indicate specific QMEE means for females with 
brain injury. It is interesting to note, however, that while not significant, the mean score for 
females in the brain injury group was greater than that for the females in the control group. 
Similar results have been found in a small proportion (5%) of brain-injured patients, where 
heightened emotional empathy is parallelled with more symptoms o f anxiety (Bardenhagen 
et al., 1999).
A possible explanation for the brain injured females scoring close to the same level 
as the control group females on the EM, and attaining higher scores than the brain injured 
males on the QMEE might be related to the severity o f brain injury. The average length of
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coma for males was 44.9 (with 36% lasting less than 2 days) and for females was 11 days 
(with 50% lasting less than 2 days). While this explanation may fit the findings for the 
empathy measures, it does not follow for the emotion recognition findings where there was 
no difference between the males and females in the brain injury group on the VERT scores, 
but there were significant differences for both sexes between the groups.
It is noteworthy to mention the significant correlation between the two empathy 
measures that were intended to measure and target broadly different aspects of the construct. 
Hogan’s Empathy Measure has been reported to involve personality variables such as anxiety 
and socialization. Individuals who score higher on the EM were previously found to be better 
adjusted, have better social insight and less susceptible to depression (Davis, 1983; Hogan, 
1969; Mills & Hogan, 1978). Mehrabian and Epstein’s QMEE has been reported to be 
sensitive to an individual’s ability to be aroused in socially distressful situations. It appears, 
through the present findings, that these measures share more commonalities than originally 
thought With respect to the difference in findings between the two measures (i.e., 
individuals in the brain injury group scored significantly lower scores on the EM but not the 
QMEE), it is plausible that the EM is more sensitive to social adjustment and negative 
emotional states than the QMEE and this was reflected in the responses o f the brain injured 
group. Further, the fact that the correlation between the measures was not significant in the 
control group suggests that there are qualitative differences between the groups.
Emotion Recognition  
Compared to normal controls, individuals in the brain injury group performed 
significantly lower on all aspects o f the VERT. No demographic factors were found to be
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responsible for the overall findings. Lo wick’s (1995) study o f the VERT with a brain injured 
sample (which, incidentally, was very similar demographically to the group in the present 
study) also found no demographic differences contributing to overall results. Lowick found 
no difference between gender (which is supported by Mountain’s (1993) normative data) and 
no effect o f  education or age on any o f the VERT subscales.
Taken together, the present study partially supports the first hypothesis as it has been 
shown that compared to normal controls, individuals with brain injury (refer to Table 1) 
generated significantly lower empathy scores on the EM and the VERT but not the QMEE.
Further, with respect to the second hypothesis (i.e., scores on the ability to recognize 
emotions will covary with scores on the ability to express empathy) it was demonstrated that 
the VERT positively correlated with the EM but there was no significant correlation with the 
QMEE. Together, it appears that individuals impaired on the ability to recognize emotion 
exhibit deficits on the measure o f cognitive empathy but not emotional empathy.
The Evaluation of Emotional Situations 
While empathy does not affect a person’s ability to perceive emotion in others, 
empathy can play an important role in the interpretation o f an emotionally-loaded situation, 
and subsequently the person’s cognitive, emotional, and behavioral response to that situation. 
The next section integrates the findings on emotion recognition and empathy.
The present study has demonstrated some interesting findings and raises an intriguing 
question. Specifically, why is there a difference between the brain injury group and control 
group on the cognitive measure o f empathy (EM) and recognition o f emotion (VERT) but 
not the emotional measure o f empathy (QMEE)? With respect to this question, one possible
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explanation might be that the psychometric differences between the QMEE and EM are 
responsible for the close-to-significance-but-not-quite (p = .08) results. The EM is a forced- 
choice format which leaves less room for social desirability response bias, has a smaller SD 
(<4) in the normative data and allows levels o f  cognitive empathy to be assessed more 
readily. The QMEE (which has a SD > 20 in all reported studies) leaves a lot o f  room for 
variation between individuals (it is a 9-point scale) and is vulnerable to social desirability 
response bias and extreme response scores.
Another reason for the difference between the findings in the EM and QMEE might 
be supported by the proposal that the cognitive system of empathy lies in the dorsolateral 
fi*ontal system and the emotional system of empathy involves a broader range o f  structures 
including the orbitofirontal system and limbic system. Perhaps the lesions sustained by the 
participants are predominantly localized to areas o f the dorsolateral fi*ontal system.
Related to the nature of the brain injury is the issue o f “knowing” versus “doing”. 
Lezak (1983) and Prigatano (1987) have pointed out that a common consequence o f brain 
injury, especially with damage to the fi-ontal areas, is that the patients know how they ought 
to feel and ought to act but they fail to carry out the behavior. In other words, the patients 
recognize a situation and know how they should react, but fail to experience the appropriate 
emotions and do not behave accordingly. Perhaps the QMEE is too “face valid”. It is 
conceivable that the participants in this study knew how to respond appropriately to the 
items (thus scoring comparably to the control group), however they did not actually attribute 
emotions to their responses nor could they translate their response to a real-life situation.
“Cognitive style” is a term introduced by Klein (1954). A maladaptive coping style, 
which can be the result o f organic or psychological trauma, contributes to an interference
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with the interpretation o f the reality around an individual. One consequence of a maladaptive 
coping style is a reversion to a  pattern o f egocentricity. Miller (1998) indicates that it is 
common to see some form o f egocentricity in individuals who have sustained some form o f 
head trauma. According to Wood (1988), the thinking o f frontal-injured patients is too 
concrete and egocentric too allow subtle forms o f  social perception to change behavior. 
Cognitive impairments such as diminished insight or loss of social awareness prevent the 
patient from perceiving the subtle cues that control human behavior. With respect to the 
brain injured individuals in the present study, it can be suggested that their cognitive style 
has been affected by the trauma resulting in some impairments (i.e., in the EM but not the 
QMEE) in evaluating social situations and difficulty in behaving in a  socially desirable way. 
Related to this may be the suggestion o f O’Hara (1988) that some forms of brain injury result 
in the inability o f the neural mechanisms to generate the arousal required to effect an 
emotional experience within the individual. It might be said then, that the inability to 
recognize emotions and to have cognitive empathie awareness (which might be inferred as 
egocentricity or lack of personal insight) is a result o f  injury to certain brain regions and the 
ensuing disruption in arousal pathways.
While there are limitations to the present study (discussed later) the general findings 
suggest that impairments in emotion recognition systems parallel those in cognitive empathy 
as the brain injured group had significantly lower scores on the emotion recognition and 
cognitive empathy tasks, and these tasks were shown to be highly correlated. Intuitively it 
makes sense that in order for one to conceptualize an emotion experienced by someone else 
they would have to be able to recognize and identify the outwardly expressed emotion. It 
would be presumptuous, however, to suggest from the present data that one is a prerequisite
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for the other. One could speculate though, that traumatic brain injury to the frontal and 
temporal regions predominantly in the right hemisphere can result in the destruction o f  a 
neural system common to the processes o f emotion recognition and empathy.
Clinical Implications 
For many family members and friends o f individuals who have sustained brain 
injury, one o f the most difficult after-effects to deal with is the patient’s inappropriate social 
behaviour and decline in social sensitivity. As discussed in the early sections of this paper, 
these aspects o f social adjustment rely on the individual’s ability to perceive and represent 
the emotions and intentions o f other people. There have been numerous papers and 
suggestions on social rehabilitation for those with brain injury. One of the common themes 
in all o f these reports is that early detection o f brain injury and resulting psychosocial 
disorders is important in the rehabilitation process.
Bardenhagen et al. (1999) suggest that the behavior o f patients who have 
inappropriate reactions to emotional situations may be amenable to family education and a 
skills acquisition programme for the patient which focuses on improving their adaptive 
reactions to a range o f emotional and situational cues. In a study by Olver, Ponsford and 
Curan (1996) it was shown that at five years post-injury there continued to be increased 
cognitive, emotional and behavioral changes, and between two and five years post-injury 
there was an increase in unemployment. Olver et al. (1996) strongly recommend ongoing 
psychosocial rehabilitation for a number o f years after the injury. Grattan et al. (1994) 
suggest that rehabilitation for individuals with impairments in empathy should include 
training to develop alternate solutions to social situations.
These suggestions together with the findings o f this study can be made into a more
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inclusive recommendation for rehabilitation. Specifically, if  empathy is dependent on the 
actual perception and understanding o f  emotion, it then follows that rehabilitation training 
should involve re-leaming the basic emotions (what they “look” like, what they “sound” like 
and what they feel like) and then incorporating these emotions into more complex social 
situations where the individual will have to perceive social and emotional cues (i.e., context, 
facial expressions, body language) and consider the alternatives and their outcomes. This 
process should be started early and should involve family members.
Limitations
One of the main limitations and one that is common to the study o f brain-injury at 
large is teasing apart the effects o f the injury and the effects of personal loss resulting in a 
lifestyle change. Many o f the people in the brain-injury group were faced with the loss o f 
independence, relationships, the ability to work, and many aspects o f their pre-injury 
lifestyle. While some had excellent family support systems, others did not. These and other 
factors may have contributed to the overall findings.
Another limitation relates to the nature of the injury. Some participants sustained 
more severe injuries and were in a coma longer than others. Additionally, while the general 
region of the injuiy was established, this does not elucidate whether diffuse damage occurred 
elsewhere in the brain
With respect to sample selection, the participants (who were all volunteers) were 
contacted through their neuropsychologist or their community support program. As a result, 
all participants in this study are involved in some form o f contact and rehabilitation program 
with professionals and others who have sustained brain injury. This sample therefore, 
excludes individuals with brain injury who have not received external support.
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Final limitations include the availability of brain injured participants and sample size. 
In general research, it is recommended than an n = 20 is the lower limit. In 
neuropsychological research, however, many of the studies have fewer than 20 subjects, and 
a large percentage are case studies. The nature o f this form o f research is time consuming 
as the assessment measures are quite long to administer and score (which requires patience 
on the part of the participant and the researcher), it requires personal interaction and 
behavioral observations, and participants are a select group o f  people who are not readily 
available. For this reason, the literature base has taken a long time to develop and is the 
result of a cumulative process. The present study had 20 brain injured participants who 
represent only a small proportion of the brain injured population. Future studies could offer 
results more generalizable to the brain injured population with larger sample sizes with 
adequately sized subgroups with identified areas o f brain damage.
Future Research Considerations 
Research has been done on the aspect of recognition and identification o f  emotion 
and its attributed valence (i.e., negative valence with anger or sadness, positive valence with 
happiness; see Young et al., 1995). Also, work has been done on the lateralized perception 
of positive and negative emotions ( Joseph, 1996 for review). Investigating the role of 
lateralization o f injuiy (using advanced imaging techniques such as MRI or fMRI) on the 
valence effect o f emotion recognition and empathy would contribute to the conceptualization 
of the related processes of emotion recognition and identification, and empathie 
understanding and responding. Related to imaging techniques and localization o f injury, it 
may serve to follow up on the suggestion made by O’Hara (1988) and investigate the
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possibility that the impairments in recognition and response to emotional and social cues 
experienced by many brain injured individuals may be related to some dysfunction in the 
arousal systems.
The research literature appears to be lacking in the outcome o f  psychosocial 
rehabilitation programs specifically related to social sensitivity, emotion recognition and the 
ability to empathize or behave empathetically. By following up on recommendations made 
in this research area and reporting clinical outcomes, investigators can evaluate these 
outcomes and offer suggestions, and as a result, further the benefit o f  the patient. It is 
proposed that in a rehabilitation setting, the VERT and the EM could be used as viable 
screening instruments to identify impairments in emotion recognition and empathie 
functioning and predict an individual’s ability to engage in adaptive daily functioning. From 
this, the interpersonal functioning rehabilitation program for could be designed to the 
patient’s identified deficits. It is felt that the precision o f the QMEE is not adequate to serve 
such a function in a rehabilitation environment, however, it could be beneficial to design a 
single empathy assessment tool that would accurately assess both cognitive and emotional 
aspects o f empathy.
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Appendix A: VERT Subject Response Form
Subject number_ 
Date
Victoria Emotioa Recogiutioii Test 
Summary Scores







Transfer the five total scores fiom each o f the three subtests to the Scores chart Sum the matching and 
identifying scores and the time scores across modalities. Sum the modality scores across tasks (excluding the 
time scores). Eight composite scores are obtained:
1. the abOify to match emotion across modalities
2. the abilify to identify emotion across modalities
3. the abilify to match intensify o f emotion across modalities
4. the ability to identify the intensify o f emotion across modalities




Instructions to tester Read the instructions below to the subject. Circle the response given by the subject 
(the correct answer is underlined).
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Visual Recognition
This test looks at how well you can lecognise emotion on other people's faces and in other people's 
voices. Rret I am going to show you some pictures o f people's feces. These people are portnaying one o f  
these four emotions (show card and read) and they way  be showing a little bit, a moderate amount or a great 
deal o f that emotion (show card). On each page you will see two pictures. I  want you to tell me whether-the 
emotion on the two faces is the same or difierent and what emotion is being portrayed. Then I want you to 
tell me i f  the intensity in the two pictures is the same or difkrent and what iiuensify is b dng portrayed. Let's 






A. ^ S H F r




A. 1 2 3
B. 1 2 3
S D A. A n S H F r
B. A n S H F r
A. 1 2 3
B. 1 2 3
3. S D A. A n S H F r
B. A n S H F r
S D A. 1 2 3
B. 1 2 3
4. S D A. A n S H F r
B. A n S H F r
S D A. 1 2 3
B. 1 2 3
5. S D A  An S H F [  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
7. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. An S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
8 . S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
9. S D A  An S H Fr 
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  





A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D 
S D
A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
A  1 2 3  




A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  




Match Identify_ Match Identify
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Auditory Récognition
This next part is a lot like the test we just did, except this time you are going to hear two voices. 
The words that are being spoken  arc not real words -  don't worry about what the voices say -just tell me if  the 
emotion in these voices is the same or difierent and what emotion is  being portrayed. Also, I want you to tell 
me whether the intensity is the same or difkrent and what intensity is being portrayed.
Emotion Intensitv Score
Match Identify 
1. S D  A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
Match Identify
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
2. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  





g D  
S D  
S D  
S D
A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
A  A n S H F r  





A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
7. S D A  A n S H B :  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
8 . S D A  An S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
9. S D A  An S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
10. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
11 . S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3




A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
Identify_
S D A  1 2 3  
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Visual/Auditoiy Recognition
This next part is just like the fiist two tests, excqtt this time, IH show you a picture and let you 
listen to a  voice at the same time. Tell me if  the emotion on the face and in the voice is the same or difierent 




1. S D  A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
Match Identify
S D A  1 2 3  
B- I 2 3
2. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
3. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
5. S D A  A n S H ^  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. I 23
6 . S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
7. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
8. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
9. S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 2 3
10. S D A  A n S H F f  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  
B. 1 23
11 . S D A  A n S H F r  
B. A n S H F r
S D A  1 2 3  





A  A n S H F r  
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Appendix B; H ogan Em pathy Scale
Please answer all questions. I f  you agree with a statement or feel that it is true about you answer 
TRUE. If you disagree with a statement, or feel that it is not true about you, answer FALSE.
TRUE FALSE
1. A person needs to “show o f f ’ a little now and then.
2. I liked “Alice in Wonderland” by Lewis Carrol.
3. Clever, sarcastic people make me feel very uncomfortable.
4. I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.
5. I feel sure that there is only one true religion.
6. I am afraid o f  deep water.
7. I must admit I often try to get my own way regardless o f  what others 
may want.
8. I have at one time or another in my life tried my hand at writing 
poetry.
9. Most o f  the arguments or quarrels I get into are over matters o f  
principle.
10. I would like the job o f  a foreign correspondent for a newspaper.
11. People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed o f  
themselves.
12. I prefer a shower to a bathtub.
13. I always try to consider die other fellow’s feelings before I do 
something.
14. I usually don’t like to talk much unless I am with people I know  
very well.
15. I can remember “playing sick” to get out o f  something.
16. I like to keep people guessing what I’m going to do next
17. Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to 
it.
1 8 . 1  like to talk before groups o f  people.
19. When a m an is with a woman he is usually thinking about things 
related to her sex.
20. Only a fool would try to change our American way o f  life.
21. My parents were always very strict and stem with me.
22. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things 
I’m not supposed to.
23. I think I would like to belong to a singing club.
24. I think I am usually a leader in my group.
25. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
26. I don’t like to work on a problem unless there is the possibility o f  
coming out with a clear-cut unambiguous answer.
27. It bothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily 
routine.
28. I have a natural talent for influencing people.
29. I don’t ready care whether people like me or dislike me.
30. The trouble with many people is that they don’t take things 
seriously enough.
31. It is hard for me just to sit stid and relax.
32. Once in a while I think o f things too bad to talk about.
33. I feel Aat it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut when I’m in 
trouble.
34. I am a good mixer.
35. I am an important person.
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36. I like poetry.
37. My feelings are not easily hurt.
38. I have met problems so full o f  possibilities that I have been unable 
to make tq) my mind about them.
39. Often I can’t understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.
40. What others think o f  me does not bother me.
41. I would like to be a journalist.
42. I like to talk about sex.
43. My way o f  doing things is apt to be misunderstood by others.
44. Sometimes without any reason or even when things are going  
wrong I feel excitedly happy, “on top o f  the world.”
45. I like to be with a crowd who plays jokes on one another.
46. My mother or father often made me obey even when I thought that 
it was unreasonable.
47. I easily become impatient with people.
48. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love.
49. I tend to be interested in several different hobbies rather than to 
stick to one o f  them for a long time.
50. I am not easily angered.
51. People have often misunderstood my intentions when I was trying 
to put them right and be helpful.
52. I am usually calm and not easily upset.
53. I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game.
54. I am often so annoyed when someone tries to get ahead o f  me in a 
line o f  people that I speak to him about it.
55. I used to like hopscotch.
56. I  have never been made especially nervous over trouble that any 
members o f  my family have gotten into.
57. As a rule I have little difBculty in “putting myself into other 
people’s shoes.”
58. I have seen some things so bad that I almost felt like crying.
59. Disobedience to the govenunent is never justified.
60. It is the duty o f  a citizen to support his country, right or wrong.
61. I am usually rather short-tempered with people who come around 
and bother me with foolish questions.
62. I have a pretty clear idea o f  what I would try to impart to my 
students if  I were a teacher.
63. I enjoy the company o f  strong-willed people.
64. I frequently undertake more than I can accomplish.
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Appendix C: Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy
For each o f the following statements, indicate your answer by circling the appropriate number.
I. It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.
- 4 - 3  -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
very strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly






2. People make too much of the feelings and sensitivity of animals.
-4  -3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3 +4
very strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly very
strongly disagree disagree opinion agree agree strongly
disagree agree
3. I often find public displays of affection annoying
- 4 - 3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3 +4
very strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly very
strongly disagree disagree opinion agree agree strongly
disagree agree
4. I am armoyed by unhappy people who are just sorry for themselves.
















































-3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly %ree strongly























































9. I tend to lose control when I am bring bad news to people.
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11. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and unemotional.
-1 0 +1 

















12. 1 would rather be a social worker than work in a job training center.
0-2 -1  +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










-3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










-3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










-3  -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










- 3 -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly





17. Some songs make me happy.




-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly









18. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel
0-2 -1  +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly
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23. Sometimes at the movies 1 am amused by the amount o f crying and sniffling aroimd me.
- 3 -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly












-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
disagree s li^ tly  no slightly agree strongly
disagree opinion agree agree


































-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










- 3 -2 -1 0 + 1  +2 +3
strongly disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly
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-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly










-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
disagree slightly no slightly agree strongly





31. 1 become very involved when I watch a movie.



















32. I often find that 1 can remain cool in spite of the excitement around me.




-1  +1 +2 +3
slightly no slightly agree strongly





33. Little children sometimes cry for no apparent reason.






0 +1 +2 +3 44
no slightly agree strongly very
opinion agree agree strongly
agree
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Appendix D: Consent Form
I agree to participate in the research project, conducted by Amy Darling, which 
investigates the ability to recognize and identify facial and vocal emotion and the capacity 
to interpret emotions in a variety of social settings. The nature and purpose o f this 
research has been explained to me and I have read and understood the information letter.
As a participant, I understand that the test session will take place at St. Joseph’s Hospital 
and I will be asked to complete four questionnaires which will take approximately IV2 
hours. Three questionnaires are paper and pencil format which include questions, but are 
not limited to: age, gender, history o f brain injury, and aspects o f emotions experienced 
by myself and others. I f  I require assistance reading or recording your answers, assistance 
will be provided. The fourth test, which will take about 30 minutes, involves the 
simultaneous presentation o f emotions through two pictures, two sound recordings, and 
o f a combination of a picture and a sound recording. I understand that I will be asked 
whether the emotions displayed in the photos or sound clips are the same, to identify the 
emotion(s) and to identify whether the intensity in the presented emotions are the same or 
different. While it is anticipated that the testing experience will be a pleasant one I 
understand that if  at any point I feel distressed, I can withdraw without consequence and a 
counselor will be made available to me if  required.
I understand that my participation is completely voluntary and that I may withdraw from 
the study at any time without penalty and without giving my reasons for withdrawal. If I 
feel emotionally or physically upset following the testing session, I am aware that a 
counselor will be made available to me. I also understand that my test results will not be 
identified with my name in any way.
I have been informed that aU data will be kept in a securely locked file at Lakehead 
University for seven years. The test results and other data will be identified only by 
number (not by name), and will be kept in a separate location from this consent form. 
Upon completion, results o f this study will be made available upon request.
Name (print) Signature
Date Wimess
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Appendix E; Demographic Sheet (Controls)
Partjcinant Question Sheet
* Note: Your identity will be kept strictly confidential. Results wül be coded by number, 
and no information which could identify you will be released.
Testing Date:_____________________ Participant Number:___________
Date o f  Birth:______________  Age:______________
(dd/mm/yy)
Gender: M / F What hand do you write with? right / left
What is your first language?_________________
Ethnic Background (check the one that best applies to you):
 Native Canadian  Asian  Afiican-American  Caucasian
 Other (specify)
What is your marital status?  Single Married  Divorced  Widowed
Do you live with anyone? (specify who)_____________________
Currently, what is your highest achieved level o f education:___ high school
 college
 university, year____
Have you ever had a serious head injury?
Have you ever had an accident resulting in unconsciousness?
If so, for how long were you unconscious?_________
Have you ever had a seizure?___________________________
Have you ever had blackouts or fainting spells?
Are you currently taking any medications? (specify)
Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder?
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Appendix £  (Cont’d): Demographic Sheet (BI Group)
Participant Question Sheet
* Note: Your identity wül be kept strictly confidential. Results will be coded by number, 
and no information which could identify you will be released. Try to answer the questions 
as best as you can. Feel firee to ask for clarification.
Testing Date:  Participant Number;________________
Date o f Birth:______________ Age:____
(dd/mm/yy)
Gender: M /  F What hand do you write with? right / left
What is your first language?_________________
Ethnic Background (check the one that best applies to you):
 Native C anadian   Asian  African-American  Caucasian
 Other (specify)
What is your marital status?  Single Married  Divorced  Widowed
Do you live with anyone? (specify)______________________
What is your highest achieved level o f education:___ grade school (grade)_________
 high school (grade)__________
college (diploma ) _ 
university (degree)
What is (or has been) your major occupation? 
How and when did you sustain your injury?__
If applicable, how long were you: in a com a?__________ hospitalized?_
Did you return to your previous occupation after sustaining the injury?___
Prior to the accident, what is the last thing that you can remember?_____
After the accident, what is the first thing that you can remember?_______
Are you currently taking any medications? (specify)__________________
Have you ever been diagnosed with a  psychiatric disorder?____________
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